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The PAC-learning model is distribution-independent in the sense that the learner must
reach a learning goal with a limited number of labeled random examples without any
prior knowledge of the underlying domain distribution. In order to achieve this, one needs
generalization error bounds that are valid uniformly for every domain distribution. These
bounds are (almost) tight in the sense that there is a domain distribution which does
not admit a generalization error being significantly smaller than the general bound. Note
however that this leaves open the possibility to achieve the learning goal faster if the
underlying distribution is ‘‘simple’’. Informally speaking, we say a PAC-learner L is ‘‘smart’’
if, for a ‘‘vast majority’’ of domain distributions D, L does not require significantly more
examples to reach the ‘‘learning goal’’ than the best learner whose strategy is specialized
to D. In this paper, focusing on sample complexity and ignoring computational issues, we
show that smart learners do exist. This implies (at least from an information-theoretical
perspective) that full prior knowledge of the domain distribution (or access to a huge
collection of unlabeled examples) does (for a vast majority of domain distributions) not
significantly reduce the number of labeled examples required to achieve the learning goal.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We are concerned with sample-efficient strategies for properly PAC-learning a finite class H of concepts over a finite
domain X . In the general PAC-learning framework, a learner is exposed to a worst-case analysis by asking the following
question: what is the smallest sample sizem = mH (ε, δ) such that, for every target concept h ∈ H and every distribution D
on X , the probability (taken overm randomly chosen and correctly labeled examples) for returning an ε-accurate hypothesis
fromH is at least 1− δ? It is well known [8,13] that (up to some logarithmic factors) there are matching upper and lower
bounds on mH (ε, δ). The proof for the lower bound makes use of a fiendish distribution D∗ε which makes the learning task
quite hard. The lower bound remains valid when D∗ε is known to the learner. While this almost completely determines the
sample size that is required in the worst-case, it leaves open the question whether the learning goal can be achieved faster
when the underlying domain distributionD is significantly simpler thanD∗ε . Furthermore, if it can be achieved faster, it leaves
open the question whether this can be exploited only by a learner who is specialized to D or if it can be as well exploited
by a ‘‘smart’’ PAC-learner who has no prior knowledge about D. This is precisely the question that we try to answer in this
paper.
Our main result: In our paper, it will be convenient to think of the target class H , the sample size m and the accuracy
parameter ε as fixed, respectively, and to figure out the smallest value for δ such thatm examples suffice to meet the (ε, δ)-
criterion of PAC-learning.1 Let δ∗D(ε,m) denote the smallest value for δ that can be achieved by a learner who is specialized
to D. A general PAC-learner who must cope with arbitrary distributions can clearly not be specialized to every distribution
✩ This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Grant SI 498/8-1.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address:malte.darnstaedt@rub.de (M. Darnstädt).
1 This is obviously equivalent to discussing the sample size as a function in ε and δ.
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at the same time. Nevertheless we can associate a quantity δLD(ε,m) with L that is defined as the smallest value of δ that
such that m examples are sufficient to meet the (ε, δ)-criterion provided that L was exposed to the domain distribution D.
Ideally, we would like to prove that there is a PAC-learner L such that, for every domain distribution D, δLD(ε,m) = δ∗D(ε,m).
This would be a strong result as it is basically saying that, for every D, the learning progress of L (without prior knowledge
of D) is made at the same speed as the learning progress of the learner whose strategy is perfectly specialized to D. We will,
however, provide some compensation for having no prior knowledge of D and arrive at a slightly weaker result:
Limitation 1: We aim at an inequality of the form
δLD(2ε,m) ≤ c · δ∗D(ε,m) (1)
where c denotes a constant (not even depending onH). In other words, Lmay be twice as inaccurate as the learner
who is specialized to D, and its probability to fail may be larger by a constant factor.
Limitation 2: The inequality (1) is not verified for all distributions D but for a volume of approximately 1− 2/c , say when
measured with the uniform distribution over the |X |-dimensional probability simplex (whose points represent
distributions over X). Actually the final result is somewhat more general: we can fix any measure µ on the |X |-
dimensional probability simplex (expressing which domain distributions we consider as particularly important),
and still achieve validity of (1) for a volume of approximately 1−2/c of all domain distributions. Clearly, the design
of the smart learner L changes when µ changes.
The formal statement is found in Theorem 10.
Relation of our work to semi-supervised learning: Our work is related to the question to which extent unlabeled data (which
are cheap) help to save labeled data (which are expensive). In the framework of active learning, where the learner selects
some data from an unlabeled random sample andmay ask for their labels, the saving of labels can be quite significant [10,11,
1,3,12,14,4]. The picture is less clear in the framework of semi-supervised learning where the learner gets randomly chosen
unlabeled and randomly chosen labeled data but has no influence on the selection of the latter. In this framework, it is
usually assumed that there is a kind of compatibility between the target concept and the domain distribution.2 There is a
common intuition that, without assumptions of this kind, the benefit of semi-supervised learning is marginal. This intuition
is supported by [5] whose authors consider the PAC-learning model without any extra-assumptions and compare a learner
with full prior knowledge of the domain distributionD (representing the semi-supervised learner) with a learner that has no
prior knowledge about D (the classical PAC-learner). They consider some basic concept classes over the real line and show
that for absolutely continuous distributions D knowledge of D does not lower the label complexity by more than a constant
factor. The main result in this paper goes in a similar direction but is incomparable to the findings in [5]: on one hand it is
quite general by dealing with arbitrary finite concept classes; on the other hand, the higher level of generality comes at the
price of introducing some limitations (with Limitation 2 being particularly annoying).
Relation of our work to PAC-learning under a fixed distribution: Our results are also weakly related to [6] where upper and
lower bounds (in terms of cover- and packing-numbers associated withH and D) on the sample size are presented when
H is PAC-learned under a fixed distribution D. One line of attack for proving our results could have been to design a general
PAC-learner that, when exposed to D, achieves the learning goal with a sample size that does not significantly exceed the
lower bound on the sample size in the fixed-distribution setting. However, since the best upper and lower bounds known
for PAC-learning under a fixed distribution leave a significant gap (although being related by a polynomial of small degree),
this approach does not look very promising.
Structure of the paper: Section 2 clarifies the notation that is used throughout the paper. Section 3 is devoted to learning
under a fixed distribution D. This setting is cast as a zero-sum game between two players, the learner and her opponent,
such that the Minimax Theorem from game theory applies. This leads to a nice characterization of δ∗D = δ∗D(ε,m). It is
furthermore shown that, when the opponent makes his draw first, there is a strategy for the learner that, although it does
not at all depend on D, does not perform much worse than the best strategy that is specialized to D. Section 4 is devoted to
the general PAC-learning framework where the learner has no prior knowledge of the underlying domain distribution. It is
shown, again by game-theoretic methods, that ‘‘Smart PAC-learners’’ do exist. Section 5 mentions some open problems.
2. Notations
We assume that the reader is familiar with the PAC-learning framework and knows the Minimax Theorem from game-
theory [15].
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation:
• For every n ≥ 1, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
• X denotes a finite domain.
• H = {h1, . . . , hN} denotes a finite concept class over domain X . Thus, every h ∈ H is a function of the form
h : X → {0, 1}. We shall assume henceforth that the hypothesis class coincides withH .
2 See the introduction of [9] for a discussion of themost popular assumptions, and see [2] for a systematic study of a PAC-like learningmodel augmented
by compatibility-assumptions.
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• D denotes a domain distribution.
• m denotes the sample size.
• ε denotes the accuracy parameter.
• δ denotes the confidence parameter which bounds from above the ‘‘expected failure rate’’ where ‘‘failure’’ means the
delivery of an ε-inaccurate hypothesis.
• (x, b) ∈ Xm × {0, 1}m denotes a labeled sample.
• For x = (ξ1, . . . , ξm) ∈ Xm and h ∈ H , we set
h(x) = (h(ξ1), . . . , h(ξm)) ∈ {0, 1}m.
• As usual, a learning function is a mapping of the form
L : Xm × {0, 1}m → H,
i.e., it maps labeled samples to hypotheses.L1, . . . ,LM denotes the list of all learning functions.• For two hypotheses h, h′ ∈ H ,
h⊕ h′ := {ξ ∈ X : h(ξ) ≠ h′(ξ)}
denotes their symmetric difference. Recall that h is called ε-accurate for h′ w.r.t. D if D(h⊕ h′) ≤ ε.
As usual, a hypothesis h is said to be consistent with sample (x, b) if h(x) = b. The version space for sample (x, b) is the set
of all hypotheses fromH being consistent with (x, b). A learning functionL is said to be consistent if it maps every sample
to a hypothesis from the corresponding version space.
A deterministic learner can be identified with a learning function (if computational issues are ignored). We consider,
however, randomized learners. Each-one of these can be identified with a probability distribution over the set of all learning
functions. A learner (or her strategy) is called consistent if she puts probability mass 1 on consistent learning functions.
3. Learning under a fixed distribution revisited
In this section, the domain distribution D is fixed and known to the learner. We shall describe PAC-learning under
distribution D as a zero-sum game between two players: the learner who makes the first draw and her opponent who
makes the second draw. This will offer the opportunity to apply theMinimax Theorem and to arrive at the ‘‘dual game’’ with
the opponent making the first draw. Details follow.
For every ε > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M , j = 1, . . . ,N , x ∈ Xm, and b ∈ {0, 1}m, let Iε,x,bD [i, j] be the Bernoulli variable indicating
whether the hypothesisLi(x, b) is ε-inaccurate w.r.t. target concept hj and domain distribution D, i.e.,
Iε,x,bD [i, j] =

1 if D(Li(x, b)⊕ hj) > ε
0 otherwise. (2)
Now, let
Aε,mD [i, j] := Ex∈Dm

I
ε,x,hj(x)
D [i, j]

=
−
x
Dm(x)I
ε,x,hj(x)
D [i, j] (3)
= Pr
x∼Dm

Li(x, hj(x)) is ε-inaccurate for hj w.r.t. D

. (4)
If D, ε,m are obvious from context, we omit these letters as subscripts or superscripts in what follows. A randomized
learner is given by a vector p ∈ [0, 1]M that assigns a probability pi to every learning function Li (so that∑Mi=1 pi = 1).
Thus, wemay identify learners withmixed strategies for the ‘‘row-player’’ in the zero-sum game associated with A. Wemay
view the ‘‘column-player’’ in this game as an opponent of the learner. A mixed strategy for the opponent is given by a vector
q ∈ [0, 1]N that assigns an à priori probability qj to every possible target concept hj (so that∑Nj=1 qj = 1). In the sequel, Aj
denotes the jth column of A. If the learners plays strategy p and her opponent plays strategy q (or the pure strategy j, resp.),
the former has to pay an amount of p⊤Aq (or an amount of p⊤Aj, resp.) to the latter.
This game models PAC-learning under distribution D in the sense that the following holds for given parametersm, ε, δ:
there is a probabilistic learning strategy (=distribution over the learning functions that map a labeled sample of sizem to a
hypothesis) that, regardless of the choice of the target concept, leads to an ε-accurate hypothesis with a probability 1 − δ
(or more) of success iff the row-player in the game with payoff-matrix A = Aε,mD has a mixed strategy p such that for every
pure strategy j of the opponent (i.e., for every choice of the target concept) p⊤Aj ≤ δ.
We now put the Minimax Theorem in position. It states that
min
p
max
q
p⊤Aq = max
q
min
p
p⊤Aq. (5)
In the sequel, we denote the optimal value in (5) by δ∗D(ε,m). In order to establish a relation between δ
∗
D(ε,m) and strategies
for learners without prior knowledge ofD (whichwill prepare the ground for the design of a smart PAC-learner in Section 4),
we proceed as follows:
• We switch to the dual game with the opponent making the first draw.
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• We consider a slightly modified dual gamewhere the opponent makes the first draw, a labeled sample of sizem is drawn
at random afterwards, and finally the learner picks a hypothesis (pure strategy) or a distribution over hypotheses (mixed
strategy).
• We describe a good strategy in the modified dual game that can be played without prior knowledge of D.
Consider the dual game with the opponent drawing first. Since a mixed strategy for the learner is a distribution over
learning functions (mapping a labeled sample to a hypothesis), we may equivalently think of the learner as waiting for a
random labeled sample (x, b) and then playing a mixed strategy over H that depends on (x, b). In order to formalize this
intuition, we consider the new payoff-matrix A˜ = A˜εD given by
A˜[i, j] =

1 if hi is ε-inaccurate for hj w.r.t. D
0 otherwise.
We associate the following game with A˜:
(1) The opponent selects a vector q ∈ [0, 1]N specifying à priori probabilities for the target concept. Note that this implicitly
determines
• the probability
Q (b|x) =
−
j:hj(x)=b
qj
of labeling a given sample x by b,
• and the à posteriori probabilities
Q (j|x, b) =
 qj
Q (b|x) if hj(x) = b
0 otherwise
(6)
for target concept hj given the labeled sample (x, b).
For sake of a compact notation, let q˜(x, b) denote the vector whose jth component is Q (j|x, b).
(2) A labeled sample (x, b) is produced at random with probability
Pr(x, b) = Dm(x)Q (b|x). (7)
(3) The learner chooses a vector p˜(x, b) ∈ [0, 1]N (that may depend on D, q and (x, b)) specifying her mixed strategy
w.r.t. payoff-matrix A˜. We say that the learner’s strategy p˜ is consistent if, for every (x, b), p˜(x, b) puts probability mass
1 on the version space for (x, b).
(4) The learner suffers loss p˜(x, b)⊤A˜q˜(x, b) so that her expected loss, averaged over all labeled samples, evaluates to∑
x,b Pr(x, b)p˜(x, b)
⊤A˜q˜(x, b).
In the sequel, the games associated with A and A˜, respectively, are simply called A-game and A˜-game, respectively.
Lemma 1. Let q ∈ [0, 1]N be an arbitrary but fixed mixed strategy for the learner’s opponent. Then the following holds:
(1) Every mixed strategy p ∈ [0, 1]M for the learner in the A-game can be mapped to a mixed strategy p˜ for the learner in the
A˜-game so that
p⊤Aq =
−
x,b
Pr(x, b)p˜(x, b)⊤A˜q˜(x, b). (8)
Moreover, p˜ is a consistent strategy for the A˜-game if p is a consistent strategy for the A-game.
(2) The mapping p → p˜ is surjective, i.e., every mixed strategy for the learner in the A˜-game has a pre-image. Moreover, one can
always find a consistent strategy p as a pre-image of a consistent strategy p˜.
Proof. Recall thatM is the number of learning functions of the formL : Xm× {0, 1}m → H . Thus, every probability vector
p ∈ [0, 1]M is a probability measure on the discrete product spaceΩ = H × · · · ×H with one factorH for every labeled
sample (x, b) ∈ Xm × {0, 1}m. Recall thatH = {h1, . . . , hN}. Thus, every probability vector p˜(x, b) ∈ [0, 1]N is a probability
measure on the discrete spaceH which can be identified with factor (x, b) ofΩ . We define the mapping p → p˜ by setting
p˜(x, b) equal to the marginal measure obtained by restricting p to factor (x, b) ofΩ , i.e.,
p˜i′(x, b) =
−
i:Li(x,b)=hi′
pi. (9)
The following computation verifies (8):
p⊤Aq (3)=
−
x
Dm(x)
N−
j=1
M−
i=1
Ix,hj(x)[i, j]piqj
=
−
x,b
Dm(x)
−
j:hj(x)=b
M−
i=1
Ix,b[i, j]piqj
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=
−
x,b
Dm(x)
−
j:hj(x)=b
N−
i′=1
−
i:Li(x,b)=hi′
Ix,b[i, j]  
=A˜[i′,j]
piqj
=
−
x,b
Dm(x)
−
j:hj(x)=b
N−
i′=1
A˜[i′, j]qj
−
i:Li(x,b)=hi′
pi
(9)=
−
x,b
Dm(x)
N−
i′=1
−
j:hj(x)=b
A˜[i′, j]p˜i′(x, b)qj
(6)=
−
x,b
Dm(x)Q (b|x)
N−
i′=1
N−
j=1
A˜[i′, j]p˜i′(x, b)Q (j|x, b)
(7)=
−
x,b
Pr(x, b)p˜(x, b)⊤A˜q˜(x, b).
In order to show that p → p˜ is surjective, assume that a measure p˜(x, y) onH is given for every labeled sample (x, b) and
choose p as the corresponding product measure so that, for every i = 1, . . . ,N ,
pi =
∏
x,b
p˜Li(x,b)(x, b). (10)
Clearly, the marginal measure obtained by restricting p to factor (x, b) ofΩ coincides with the measure p˜(x, b) we started
with. In other words, the product measure is a pre-image of p˜.
As far as consistency is concerned, finally note the following. If p puts probability mass 1 on consistent learning functions,
then p˜, defined according to (9), puts probability mass 1 on the version space for (x, b). Conversely, if p˜ puts probability
mass 1 on the version space for (x, b), then p, defined according to (10), puts probability mass 1 on consistent learning
functions. 
In the sequel, we list some consequences of Lemma 1. For instance, the lemma immediately implies that the optimal
value in the A-game (where A = Aε,mD ) coincides with the optimal value in the A˜-game (where A˜ = A˜εD), i.e.,
δ∗D(ε,m) = minp maxq p
⊤Aq = max
q
−
x,b

Pr(x, b) · min
p˜(x,y)

p˜(x, y)⊤A˜q˜(x, b)

. (11)
Remark 2. Notice that (11) offers the opportunity to prove (non-constructively) the existence of a good learning strategy
for the A-game with the learner making the first draw, by presenting a good (sample-dependent) learning strategy for the
A˜-game with the learner making the second draw.
The next two results concern ‘‘trivial domain distributions’’ whose prior knowledge leads to zero-loss in the A-game.
Corollary 3. If δ∗D(ε,m) = 0, then the following holds: for every x ∈ Xm such that Dm(x) > 0, and for every b ∈ {0, 1}m, there
exists a hypothesis h∗ ∈ H that is ε-accurate for every hypothesis in the version space for (x, b).
Proof. Assume that there exists an x ∈ Xm such that Dm(x) > 0, and there exists a b ∈ {0, 1}m such that
∀h∗ ∈ H, ∃h ∈ H : h(x) = b ∧ D(h∗ ⊕ h) > ε. (12)
We have to show that this assumption leads to the conclusion δ∗D(ε,m) > 0. To this end, pick x and b such that Dm(x) > 0
and such that (12) is valid. Let q be the uniform distribution onH . According to (7), we may conclude that Pr(x, b) > 0. An
inspection of (11) now reveals that δ∗D(ε,m) > 0, as desired. 
Corollary 4. If δ∗D(ε,m) = 0, then every consistent learner suffers loss 0 in the A2ε,mD -game.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, it suffices to show that every strategy p˜(x, b) for the A˜-game that puts probability mass 1
on the version space for (x, b) suffers loss 0 in the A˜-game. According to Corollary 3, there exists a hypothesis h∗ that is ε-
accurate for every hypothesis in the version space V for (x, b). This clearly implies, that every hypothesis in V is 2ε-accurate
for every other function in V . Thus, putting probability mass 1 on V leads to loss 0. 
We close this section with a result that prepares the ground for our analysis of general PAC-learners in Section 4:
Lemma 5. Let ε > 0 be a given accuracy, and let m ≥ 1 be a given sample size. For every probability vector q ∈ [0, 1]N , and
every domain distribution D, the following holds:−
x,b
Pr(x, b)q˜(x, b)⊤A˜2εD q˜(x, b) ≤ 2δ∗D(ε,m). (13)
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Fig. 1. The polygon represents the version space for (x, b). The circle represents the hypotheses that are ε-close to h∗ w.r.t. D. The hatched area represents
the loss induced by h∗ on sample (x, b).
Proof. The left hand-side in (13) represents the learners loss in the A˜2εD -game when the opponent plays strategy q (the à
priori probabilities for the target concepts) and the learner plays strategy q˜(x, b) on sample (x, b). Recall that q˜(x, b) is the
collection of à posteriori probabilities for the target concepts. Since the à posteriori probabilities outside the version space
V := {h ∈ H : h(x) = b}
are zero, only target concepts in V can contribute to the learner’s loss. In the remainder of the proof, we simply write A˜ε
instead of A˜εD, and A˜
ε
i denotes the ith row of this matrix. Given q and (x, b), the term A˜
ε
i q˜(x, b) represents the loss suffered
by a learner with hypothesis hi in the A˜εD-game. This loss equals the total à posteriori probability of the hypotheses from the
version space that are not ε-close to hi w.r.t. domain distributionD. It is minimized by picking a hypothesis h∗ = hi∗(x,b) ∈ H
which maximizes the total à posteriori probability of hypotheses that are ε-close to h∗ w.r.t. D. With this notation, it follows
that −
x,b
Pr(x, b)A˜εi∗(x,b)q˜(x, b) ≤ δ∗D(ε,m) (14)
with equality if the strategy q of the learner’s opponent is optimal. The situation is visualized in Fig. 1. We are now prepared
to verify (13). Assume that, given q and (x, b), the learner applies strategy q˜(x, b) instead of choosing the best hypothesis h∗.
There are two ‘‘unlucky cases’’:
• The learners random hypothesis falls into the hatched area in Fig. 1.
• The opponent’s random target concept falls into this hatched area.
Each of the unlucky events happens with a probability that equals the total à posteriori probability of the hypotheses in
the hatched area, i.e. it happens with probability A˜εi∗(x,b)q˜(x, b), respectively. If none of the unlucky events occurs, then the
learner’s hypothesis and the target concept fall into the circle in Fig. 1 so that they are 2ε-close to each other w.r.t. D. Our
discussion shows that
q˜(x, b)⊤A˜2ε q˜(x, b) ≤ 2A˜εi∗(x,b)q˜(x, b),
which, in view of (14), yields (13). 
It is important to note that no knowledge of D is required to play the strategy p˜ = q˜ in the A˜-game (with the opponent
making the first draw). Nevertheless, asmade precise in Lemma 5, this is a reasonably good strategy for any fixed underlying
domain distribution. Note furthermore that a learner with strategy q˜(x, b) is consistent, since the à posteriori probabilities
assign probability mass 1 to the version space for (x, b).
The puzzled reader might ask why we are not done with our design of a smart PAC-learner: we ended-up with a good
strategy for the learner that can be played without prior knowledge of the domain distribution. So what? The problem is,
however, that so far we considered a game that models PAC-learning under a fixed distribution. A game that models general
PAC-learning would correspond to a payoff-matrix that decomposes into blocks with one block per domain distribution.3
It turns out, unfortunately, that this considerably increases the power of the opponent. In particular, he could play a mixed
strategy that fixes
3 Ignore for the moment the fact that there are infinitely many blocks. That wouldn’t pose a problem because the Minimax Theorem applies even when
the pure strategies form an infinite but compact set.
1762 M. Darnstädt, H.U. Simon / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 1756–1766
• a probability measure µ on the |X |-dimensional probability simplex
∆ := {z ∈ [0, 1]|X | : z1 + · · · + z|X | = 1}, (15)
where every z ∈ ∆ represents a measure Dz putting probability mass zν on the νth element from X for ν = 1, . . . , |X |,
• conditional à priori probabilities q(j|z) for choosing target concept hj provided that Dz is the underlying domain
distribution.
In this general setting, the à posteriori probabilities, associated with the hypotheses after having seen a labeled sample
(x, b), previously denoted q˜(x, b), are now conditioned on z as well and therefore denoted q˜(x, b|z). Consequently, the loss
suffered by a learner playing strategy p˜ formally looks as follows (compare with (11)):
Ez∼µ
−
x,b
Pr(x, b|z)p˜(x, b)⊤A˜2εDz q˜(x, b|z)

. (16)
According to Lemma 5, the learner can favorably play strategy p˜ = q˜ in the fixed-distribution setting. As can be seen
from (16), there is no uniform good choice for p˜ anymore in the general setting since q˜ is conditioned to z. For this reason,
we are not done yet and move on to Section 4.
4. Smart PAC-learners
Throughout this section we set d := |X | and X := {ξ1, . . . , ξd}. As specified in (15), ∆ denotes the d-dimensional
probability simplex so that, for every z ∈ ∆ and for all ν = 1, . . . , d, Dz(ξν) = zν .
Ideally, we would like to design a smart PAC-learner who performs well in comparison to a learner with full prior
knowledge of Dz for all choices of z ∈ ∆. This (somewhat overambitious) endeavor is briefly described (in terms of an
appropriately defined zero-sum game) in Section 4.1. After a short discussion of some measurability issues in Section 4.2,
we pursue a less ambitious goal in Section 4.3 (modeled again as a zero-sum game between the learner and her opponent)
and show that there is a smart PAC-learner who performswell in comparison to a learner with full prior knowledge of Dz for
most choices of z ∈ ∆. The total probability of the region containing the ‘‘bad choices’’ of z can be made as small as we like
(at the expense of a slightly degraded performance on the ‘‘good choices’’). Moreover, the underlying probability measure
on ∆ can be specified by a ‘‘user’’ (who can try to put high probability mass on realistic measures), and the strategy of the
smart PAC-learner can be chosen such as to adapt to this specification.
Before dipping into technical details, we would like to provide the reader with a survey on the various zero-sum games
(each-one given by a payoff-matrix) which are relevant in the sequel:
(1) The basic building stone is thematrix A = Aε,mD . The corresponding zero-sum gamemodels PAC-learning under the fixed
distribution D.
(2) When switching to classical PAC-learning with arbitrary distributions, it looks natural to analyze a block-matrix that
reserves one block Aε,mDz for every z ∈ ∆. It will however be more clever to insert a scaling factor 1/δ∗z in block z where
δ∗z = δ∗Dz (ε,m) is the best possible expected failure-rate of a learner with full prior knowledge of Dz : this will force the
learner to choose a strategy that achieves a small ratio between her own expected failure-rate and δ∗z . The payoff-matrix
obtained after scaling is denoted R. A learner playing successfully the R-gamewould achieve a small ‘‘worst performance
ratio’’.
(3) Since we were not able to find a good strategy for the learner in the R-game, we switch to the R¯-game. The payoff-
matrix R¯ results from R basically by averaging over all z ∈ ∆. A learner playing successfully the R¯-game achieves a small
‘‘average performance ratio’’. We shall find a good strategy for the learner in the R¯-game, and this will finally lead us to
our main result.
4.1. Towards a small worst performance ratio
In this section, we consider a game with a payoff-matrix R that is defined blockwise so that, for every z ∈ ∆, R(z) denotes
the block reserved for distribution Dz . Every block has M rows (one row for every learning function) and N columns (one
column for every possible target concept). Before we present the definition of R(z), we fix some notation.
Recall from the previous section that
A2ε,mDz [i, j] = Prx∼Dmz [Li(x, hj(x)) is 2ε-inaccurate for hj w.r.t. Dz].
When parameters ε,m are obvious from context, we shall simply write A(z) instead of A2ε,mDz . The jth column of this matrix
is then written as A(z)j . With this notation, the following holds: if the learner chooses learning function Li with probability
pi, she will fail to deliver a 2ε-accurate hypothesis with probability
max
(z,j)∈∆×[N]
p⊤A(z)j
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in the worst-case. Recall that δ∗z = δ∗Dz (ε,m) denotes the best possible expected failure-rate of a learner with full prior
knowledge of Dz . Thus,
max
j∈[N]
p⊤A(z)j
δ∗z
measures how well the PAC-learner with ‘‘strategy’’ p performs in relation to the best learner with full prior knowledge of
Dz . It is therefore reasonable to choose the block-matrix R(z) as follows:
R(z)[i, j] :=

1
δ∗Dz (ε,m)
· A2ε,mDz [i, j] if δ∗Dz (ε,m) ≠ 0
0 otherwise.
With the convention 0/0 = 1, the quantity
ρp(ε,m) := max
(z,j)∈∆×[N]
p⊤R(z)j = max
(z,j)∈∆×[N]
p⊤A(z)j
δ∗z
is called the worst performance ratio of strategy p.4 The value
ρ∗(ε,m) := min
p
ρp(ε,m)
is the best possible worst performance ratio. Note that it coincides with the smallest loss suffered by the learner in the game
with payoff-matrix R. A very strong result would be ρ∗(ε,m) ≤ c for some small constant c. But, since this is somewhat
overambitious, we shall pursue a weaker goal in the following.
4.2. Some measurability issues
Before we turn our attention to smart PAC-learners, we have to clarify first some measurability issues. Let (Ω,A, µ) be
an arbitrary measure space, and let f (ω) be a numerical function in variable ω ∈ Ω . The following facts are well known:
• f is measurable if and only if
∀α ∈ R : {ω ∈ Ω : f (ω) ≥ α} ∈ A. (17)
• The sum and the product of two measurable functions is measurable.
• The reciprocal of a strictly positive (or strictly negative, resp.) measurable function is measurable.
• The infimum (or supremum, resp.) of a sequence of measurable functions is measurable.
• IfΩ is a Borel set equipped with the Borel-algebra and f (ω) is a continuous function in ω ∈ Ω , then f is measurable.
These closure properties have the following implications:
Corollary 6. LetΩ be a Borel set equipped with the Borel-algebra. Let K be a finite or countably infinite set and, for every k ∈ K ,
letΩk be a Borel-set such thatΩ = ∪k∈KΩk. Let f (ω) be a numerical function in ω ∈ Ω that is continuous on everyΩk. Then f
is measurable.
Proof. For every α ∈ R, consider the decomposition
{ω ∈ Ω| f (ω) ≥ α} =

k∈K
{ω ∈ Ωk| f (ω) ≥ α}.
Since f is continuous on everyΩk, the right hand-side is a countable union of Borel-sets and therefore a Borel-set itself. Thus,
f satisfies (17) and is a measurable function. 
Corollary 7. Let the d-dimensional probability simplex ∆ be equipped with the Borel-algebra. Then, for every choice of
ε,m, x, b, i, j, Iε,x,bDz [i, j], Aε,mDz [i, j], and δ∗z are measurable functions in z ∈ ∆.
Proof. Since
Aε,mDz [i, j] =
−
x
Dmz (x)I
ε,x,hj(x)
Dz [i, j] and δ∗z = minp maxq p
⊤Aε,mDz q,
4 Note that, according to Corollary 4, δ∗z = 0 implies that, for every consistent strategy p, p⊤A(z)j /δ∗z = 0/0 = 1.
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it suffices to show that Iε,x,bDz [i, j] is a measurable function in z ∈ ∆. For any T ⊆ [d], consider the hyperplane
HT :=

z :
−
ν∈T
zν = ε

and the halfspaces
H+T :=

z ∈ ∆ :
−
ν∈T
zν > ε

, H−T :=

z ∈ ∆ :
−
ν∈T
zν ≤ ε

.
These halfspaces decompose ∆ into finitely many cells where every single cell can be written as an intersection of ∆ with
finitely many halfspaces (which clearly yields a Borel-set). An inspection of (2) shows that the discontinuities of Iε,x,bDz [i, j]
occur on the hyperplane
HT such that T = {ν ∈ [d] : Li(x, b)(ξν) ≠ hj(ξν)}
only and that Iε,x,bDz [i, j] is continuous on every single cell of thementioned decomposition. According to Corollary 6, Iε,x,bDz [i, j]
is a measurable function in z ∈ ∆. 
4.3. The average performance ratio of smart PAC-learners
Let µ denote an arbitrary but fixed probability measure on ∆ w.r.t. the algebra of d-dimensional Borel-sets. For every
ζ > 0, consider the following decomposition of∆:
∆0 = {z ∈ ∆ : δ∗z = 0}
∆1(ζ ) = {z ∈ ∆ : 0 < δ∗z < ζ }
∆2(ζ ) = {z ∈ ∆ : δ∗z ≥ ζ }.
Note that these sets are Borel-sets since δ∗z is a measurable function according to Corollary 7. Since probability measures are
continuous from above, we get
lim
ζ→0µ(∆1(ζ )) = µ

ζ>0
∆1(ζ )

= µ(∅) = 0. (18)
In our discussion of smart PAC-learners, it is justified to focus on domain distributions Dz such that z ∈ ∆2(ζ ) for the
following reasons:
• Distributions Dz such that z ∈ ∆0 do not pose any problem to a consistent learner. Compare with Corollary 4.
• Distributions Dz such that z ∈ ∆1(ζ ) might pose a problem to PAC-learners but the probability mass assigned to them
by µ can be made arbitrarily small according to (18).
Let µ′ be the probability measure induced by µ on∆2(ζ ). Consider the followingM × N payoff-matrix:
R¯ζ [i, j] := Ez∼µ′

R(z)[i, j] = 1
µ(∆2(ζ ))
·
∫
∆2(ζ )
R(z)[i, j] dµ.
Note that the integral exists because, for every z ∈ ∆2(ζ ), δ∗Dz (ε,m) ≥ ζ so that
R(z)[i, j] = 1
δ∗Dz (ε,m)
· A2ε,mDz [i, j]
is bounded by 1/ζ and measurable according to Corollary 7. The quantity
ρ¯p(ε,m) := max
j∈[N]
p⊤R¯ζj
is called the average performance ratio of strategy p (where the target concept is still chosen in a worst-case-fashion but the
domain distribution is chosen at random according to µ′). According to the Minimax Theorem, the following holds:
min
p
max
q
p⊤R¯ζ q = max
q
min
p
p⊤R¯ζ q. (19)
Clearly, the optimal value in (19) coincides with the best possible average performance ratio. Eq. (19) offers the opportunity
to (non-constructively) show the existence of a ‘‘good’’ learning strategywith the learnermaking the first draw, by presenting
a ‘‘good’’ learning strategy with the learner making the second draw, where ‘‘good’’ here means ‘‘achieving a small average
performance ratio’’. (Compare with Remark 2.)
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Lemma 8. For every mixed strategy q of the opponent in the R¯ζ -game, there exists a consistent mixed strategy p for the learner
such that p⊤R¯ζ q ≤ 2.
Proof. From the decomposition (8), we get the following decomposition of p⊤R¯ζ q:
p⊤R¯ζ q = p⊤ Ez∼µ′ R¯(z) q
= Ez∼µ′
[
1
δ∗z
p⊤A(z)q
]
= Ez∼µ′

1
δ∗z
−
x,b
Pr(x, b|z)p˜(x, b)A˜(z)q˜(x, b)

.
Here, δ∗z = δ∗Dz (ε,m), Pr(x, b|z) = Dmz (x)Q (b|x), A˜(z) = A˜2εDz , and the quantities Q (b|x), q˜, p˜ are derived from q and p,
respectively, as explained in Section 3. According to Lemma 5 (applied to D = Dz),−
x,b
Pr(x, b|z)q˜(x, b)A˜(z)q˜(x, b) ≤ 2δ∗z . (20)
According to Lemma 1, there exists a mixed strategy p for the learner such that p˜ = q˜. With this choice of p, we get
p⊤R¯ζ q = Ez∼µ′

1
δ∗z
−
x,b
Pr(x, b|z)p˜(x, b)A˜(z)q˜(x, b)

(20)≤ 2,
as desired. 
Corollary 9. For every probability measure µ on ∆, there exists a consistent mixed strategy for the learner with an average
performance ratio of at most 2.
Proof. The Minimax Theorem (applied to the submatrix of R¯ζ with rows corresponding to consistent learning functions)
combined with Lemma 8 yields the result. 
Corollary 9 talks about the average performance ratio which, by definition, is the performance ratio averaged over∆2(ζ )
only. Furthermore, it does not explicitly bound the probability mass of domain distributions Dz for which the smart PAC-
learner performs considerably worse than the learner with full prior knowledge of Dz . The next result, the main result in
this paper, fills these gaps:
Theorem 10. For every probability measure µ on ∆ and for every c > 1, γ > 0, there exists a mixed strategy p for the learner
such that, for j = 1, . . . ,N,
µ

z ∈ ∆ : p⊤R(z)j ≥ 2c

<
1
c
+ γ .
Proof. For sake of brevity, let E := {z ∈ ∆ : p⊤R(z)j ≥ 2c}. With this notation, µ(E) is bounded from above by
µ (E|∆0) · µ(∆0)+ µ (E|∆1(ζ )) · µ(∆1(ζ ))+ µ (E|∆2(ζ )) · µ(∆2(ζ )).
The first term contributes 0 because of Corollary 4. The second-one contributes at most µ(∆1(ζ )) which is smaller than
γ for every sufficiently small ζ . The third-one contributes at most 1/c according to Corollary 9 combined with Markov’s
inequality. Thus, Prz∼µ[E] < 1/c + γ , as desired. 
According to Theorem 10, there exists a mixed strategy p for a learner without any prior knowledge of the domain
distribution such that, in comparison to the best learnerwith full prior knowledge of the domain distribution, a performance
ratio of 2c is achieved for the ‘‘vastmajority’’ of distributions. The total probabilitymass of distributions (measured according
toµ) not belonging to the ‘‘vastmajority’’ is bounded by 1/c+γ (where γ may be chosen as small aswe like). So Theorem10
is the result that we had announced in the introduction.
5. Open problems
• For every finite hypothesis class, we have shown the mere existence of a smart PAC-learner whose average performance
ratio is bounded by 2. Gain more insight how this strategy actually works and check under which conditions it can be
implemented efficiently.
• Prove or disprove that there exists a smart PAC-learner whose worst performance ratio is bounded by a small constant.
• In the present paper, we restricted ourselves to finite domains X for ease of technical exposition (e.g., compactness of
the |X |-dimensional probability simplex). We conjecture however that this restriction can be weakened considerably.
• In the present paper, we restricted ourselves to the non-agnostic setting. Explore whether there are smart PAC-learners
in the agnostic setting.
• In the present paper, we restricted ourselves to the PAC-learning model without adding any extra-assumptions
concerning the compatibility between the target concept and the domain distribution (as they are typically made in the
framework of semi-supervised learning). Clarify which kind of extra-assumptions gives significantly more advantage to
semi-supervised learners than to (smart) fully supervised-ones.
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As for the last open question, we follow a suggestion of one of the referees and add a little comment. It is well known that in
the Co-training Model of Learning under the Conditional Independence Assumption [7], essentially one labeled example is
sufficient for a semi-supervised learner provided there are sufficiently many unlabeled random examples (e.g., see Theorem
15 in [2]). For the same model, we can prove rigorously that every fully supervised learner asymptotically requires at least
Ω

d1·d2
ε

labeled examples (and there exist classes for which this bound is tight up to logarithmic factors). Here, d1 and
d2 denote the VC-dimensions of the two concept classes to be learned in the Co-training model. Thus, as correctly predicted
by one of the referees, the last open problem in our list is partially solved: the Co-training Model of Learning under the
Conditional Independence Assumption indeed gives significantly more advantage to semi-supervised learners than to the
best fully supervised-one.5 But the issue certainly needs further clarification.
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